问题原文
原帖链接 · ylluminate · CC BY-SA 4.0
When a virtual machine Linux host server is non-Internet facing and is used exclusively on a LAN and is using a relatively well tested distribution like Proxmox, how dangerous would it be to turn off all vulnerability mitigations via the kernel arg mitigations=off?
Additionally, has anyone tested what kinds of performance gains might be seen by turning off all such mitigations?
This recently came to be a question for me when I saw this big hit that the retbleed mitigations create: https://www.phoronix.com/review/retbleed-benchmark
This line of thought extended to the curiosity of what may be the ramifications - both ill and positive - of removing all or some mitigations either via the above kernel argument or by individually turning off high-impact mitigations.
社区高分解答
原帖链接 · diya · CC BY-SA 4.0
The Linux kernel flag mitigations=[on|off] is a single toggle to easily enable/disable all available kernel mitigations for hardware vulnerabilities as listed here https://docs.kernel.org/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html
The impact of that depends of course entirely on your CPU:
When your CPU isn’t vulnerable to any of the known vulnerabilities, then none of the mitigations are applicable and the impact should effectively be zero.
When your CPU is vulnerable to some (are there even CPUs vulnerable to all of them?) the impact depends on which specific vulnerabilities and your workload.
As to a risk analysis, that also depends on your workload and user base.
On a virtualization host operated by public VPS provider, the guests are trusted less and much more likely to be malicious (or compromised) than I would expect on a internal virtualization host used exclusively by my colleagues.
For example on our virtualization hosts used for CI/CD pipelines and compute clusters, all the guests are short lived, get deployed from trusted images, run for up to a couple of hours and then get destroyed again. There we need all the performance we can get and disable the mitigations.
On a different shared cluster we host more classical server consolidation workloads; guests that get deployed there there can (and are more likely to) run “forever” rather than for hours. It has a mix of production and non-production workloads and the guests are managed by DevOps teams that are not all as diligent in patching and updating their systems and applications.
There the risk of a malicious or compromised guest is much higher, the possible reduced performance for specific workloads an acceptable trade-off and thus mitigations do get enabled there and we limit which CPU flags get exposed to the guests.
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