大网数据广告活动
服务器运维问答

How to handle domains whose names shouldn't be published by certificate transparency?

· 52CE 我爱测

I have a set of domain names that are used internally and I do not wish them to leak to the outside world (as that would give an attacker advanced knowledge of the layout of the internal network). Given Certificate Transparency s…

问题原文

原帖链接 · Chas. Owens · CC BY-SA 3.0

I have a set of domain names that are used internally and I do not wish them to leak to the outside world (as that would give an attacker advanced knowledge of the layout of the internal network). Given Certificate Transparency seems like it is gaining momentum, what is the general consensus on the best way to have private domain names? Self signed certs? Wild card certs? Something else?

社区高分解答

原帖链接 · anx · CC BY-SA 3.0

If leaking host names is part of your threat model, then CT is probably not the only source of such leakage. Think of email headers, logs, monitoring, compilers, .. lots of tools could eventually spill system names (whether host names or just part of certificates) into publicly accessible spaces. Rather, work on the underlying reasons for wanting them stay confidential.

You will not have to hide them if there is nothing secret about them. If they do reveal some information, that is usually because you are using the names to

  1. help admins navigate your own network or
  2. help coworkers to remember what URL to type.
  3. test a system internally before commercial operation

For all 3 problems, there are better solutions. The main problem of 1. is that system names usually end up not matching system roles after a number of changes. The main problem with 2. is that your coworkers should not ever by typing URLs by hand anyway - think of misspelled-domain type scams. Code names solve 3.

Recommendation: Name your internal servers with a consistent, but otherwise random scheme. Convey system <> role relationships through entirely different means. You usually do address your coworkers by their names, not by their roles - do that for your internal servers similarly.

Our internal wiki is hosted at lake.example.org. Lake doesnt mean anything, its just sufficiently different from cube.example.org (the log collection). But the evil attacker only knows there are 8 internal domains, which is not surprising for the size of the organization. If he wants to know more, he will have to come visit us & read the name tags.

摘自公开归档,保留原文语言,版式经整理,外部媒体与邮箱地址已移除。

资料来源与适用范围

资料来源
Server Fault
适用范围
以原帖系统、软件版本与发布日期为准(2018-02-20)
内容语言
中文;命令、路径和错误标识保留技术原文
本地收录日期
2026-11-15
授权说明
CC BY-SA 3.0

正文与所需资源由本站本地存储。查看来源及更新记录 ↗

请按适用版本和实际日志确认原因;本站没有对每一种系统或设备逐项执行文中的操作。